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Abstract 
Smouldering fires in wood pellet silos are not uncommon.  The fires are often 
difficult to deal with and extinguishment is a lengthy process.  Injection of inert 
gasses to prevent oxygen from reaching the smouldering fire zone and suppress 
combustion is a new firefighting strategy.  This article argues that injection of 
inert carbon dioxide into the silo headspace is unsafe.  Carbon dioxide is 
generally available as a liquid under high pressure.  When discharged, small 
particles of dry ice are formed.  The rapid flow of particles can generate 
considerable amounts of static electricity, which can act as a source of ignition 
if ignitable pyrolysis gasses are present.  This article discusses a serious wood 
pellet smouldering fire and silo explosion in Norway in 2010, which took place 
when firefighters discharged portable CO2 fire extinguishers into the 
headspace.  The attempt to suppress the fire may have ignited pyrolysis gasses.  
The article examines selected guidelines, standards, popular wood pellet 
handbooks and other literature and argues that the electrostatic hazard is 
widely under-appreciated.  In the past, major explosions have been attributed 
to electrostatic ignition of flammable vapours during the release of CO2 for 
fire prevention purposes. There is evidence to suggest that those early lessons 
learned have at least partly passed out of sight. 
 
Keywords:  
wood pellets; silo; smoldering fire; explosion; carbon dioxide; static 
electricity; 
 
Highlights: 
• deep-seated fires in wood pellets generate pyrolysis gasses 
• flammable pyrolysis gasses can travel and accumulate, e.g. in the silo 
headspace 
• fires cannot be fought with water, novel approaches call for injection of 
inert gas  
• injection of carbon dioxide may generate static electricity, leading to silo 
explosion 
• industry standards and popular pellet handbooks largely silent on the 
hazard 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Smouldering fires in wood pellet silos 
This paper in concerned with unintended ignition of pyrolysis gasses produced 
by a smouldering fire in a wood pellet storage confinement.  Although a 
smouldering fire may start for several reasons, two causal pathways appear to 
be common:   
• Freshly produced wood pellets may self-heat because energy is liberated 
from chemical oxidation, moisture absorption or biological processes.  
Heat loss is largely a surface-based phenomenon and because of the low 
surface-to-volume ratio of a large pile, any process that generates heat will 
slowly increase the temperature inside the pile.  Pockets may form where 
the temperature of the contents can rise to the temperature necessary to 
produce spontaneous ignition.  This produces an oxygen deficient 
smouldering fire deep inside the pile.   
• Wood pellets are friable and generate dust and fines when handled in the 
logistics chain.  This dust ignites easily, e.g. from overheated electric 
motors or conveyor bearings, or from mechanical friction heat between 
conveyer belts and accumulated pellets, fines and/or dust.  Small pieces of 
smouldering material are difficult to detect and embers may migrate in the 
band conveyor systems and start smouldering fires in the storage silos.  
A small smouldering fire deep inside a storage silo is difficult to detect and 
may develop into massive storage fires and cause considerable damage to 
process equipment and property [1].  
1.2 Pyrolysis gasses 
Before developing into an open surface fire, an oxygen deficient smouldering 
fire generates flammable pyrolysis gasses rich in e.g. toxic and flammable 
carbon monoxide that can travel and accumulate.  Pyrolysis gases may create 
an ignitable atmosphere in the headspace of the silo.  An internal explosion 
may result when the combustion zone eventually reaches the surface layer or if 
a source of ignition is present in the headspace.  This paper is specifically 
concerned with potential sources of ignition introduced by firefighters. 
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1.3 Water unsuitable for smouldering fires 
Surface fires in wood pellets can be fought with water, which should be applied 
gently not to kick up dust and create conditions for a dust explosion.  Applying 
water to a smouldering fire located deep inside a pile however, presents major 
practical challenges however.  In addition, the usage of water has serious 
drawbacks.  Most pellets are hygroscopic and expand when absorbing moisture.  
When fully saturated with water, compressed pellets may expand about 3.5 
times.  The wet pellets are sticky and expansion forces may lead to 
agglomeration and compaction creating a very hard and compact plug.   
This creates difficulties during clean-up when the hard material must somehow 
be broken up for removal, at times requiring a jack hammer.  Worse, the 
expansion may force agglomerations of pellet material to adhere to the walls of 
the silo, creating hangings or arch formation inside the silo.  The sheer force of 
the expansion may even break the silo walls [1].  Hangings may expose the silo 
walls to uneven loads for which they are not designed.  There are examples of 
silos that have tipped over due to excessive application of water during 
firefighting [2]. 
1.4 Alternative firefighting strategies 
The challenging nature of fighting fires in wood pellet silo and the drawbacks 
of using water have led research programmes to explore alternative firefighting 
strategies, particularly the injection of inert gasses.  Inert gasses have the 
advantages of depleting the oxygen available for combustion, of quenching the 
pyrolysis and of lowering the risk of ignition of pyrolysis gasses in the 
headspace.  The most commonly available inert gasses in large quantities are 
nitrogen and carbon dioxide. 
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2 Material and methods 
This article examines a case report of a serious silo explosion in Norway in 
2010.  The silo, which held freshly made wood pellets, experienced a deep 
seated smouldering fire.  The explosion took place when firefighters attempted 
to quench the headspace using portable CO₂ fire extinguishers.  This article 
argues that electrostatic discharges from the release of carbon dioxide may have 
ignited pyrolysis gasses in the headspace, resulting in the explosion.   
The article examines major standards, guidelines, recent editions of popular 
pellet handbooks and other literature, versions as per mid-2016.  The article 
presents examples where the hazard is not stated; where the standard, guideline 
or recommended practice give potentially ill-advised recommendations, and 
where the absence of a warning may have serious consequences. 
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3 Theory 
3.1 Carbon dioxide and static electricity 
The ability of carbon dioxide fire to generate static electricity has been known 
for almost a century.  Electrification effects associated with sliding contact 
between solid CO₂ and metal surfaces were reported as early as 1925.  German 
experiments in the 1950s confirmed that static charging does not occur during 
the release of purely gaseous CO₂, that charging associated with the flow of 
liquid CO₂ is negligible and that strong charging occurs only when solid CO₂ 
particles are present.  Butterworth and Dowling [3] provide a good overview of 
this early work. 
3.2 Portable CO₂ extinguishers 
A portable CO₂ extinguisher comprises a CO₂ storage cylinder, a control valve, 
a delivery tube and a directional horn.  The storage cylinder contains liquid 
CO₂ under its saturated vapour pressure, which at 20°C is 5.6 MPa (56 bar).  
When released, the carbon dioxide undergoes a change of phase from liquid to 
a mixture of gas and solid.  To avoid the risk of electrocution when employed 
against fires involving electrical equipment, the directional horn must be 
fabricated from an electrically insulating material.  Most of the charge 
generation is believed to occur within this horn.  If the extinguisher and 
operator are well insulated from ground, for example by an insulating floor or 
by footwear, the electrostatic potential can rise to 20-30 kV within a few 
seconds.  For some extinguisher designs, potentials up to 50 kV can be attained 
[3].  
If the operator contacts a grounded conductor, he is likely to experience an 
electrostatic shock.  Though the shock in itself is not hazardous, it can be 
severe enough to deter continuing fire-fighting action and possible ensuing 
injury is a concern.  The shock could lead to a loss of balance or cause the 
appliance to be dropped, with potentially serious consequences if the operator 
were in a precarious position such as atop a ladder. 
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3.3 Past explosions caused by the discharge of 
portable CO₂ extinguishers 
Electrostatic discharges from the release of carbon dioxide have sufficient 
energy to ignite flammable fuel/air mixtures and have been responsible for 
numerous serious accidents.  In New York Harbour in 1966, an attempt to inert 
damaged tanks of the marine tanker vessel Alva Cape with a carbon dioxide 
extinguisher, caused naphtha vapours to explode, killing four men and injuring 
seven [4].  In another case, two firefighters were fatally injured in an explosion, 
which occurred while they used a portable CO₂ extinguisher to inert a tanker 
truck [5].  
3.4 The Bitburg disaster 
Ignition can take place even if carbon dioxide is released into steel pipework 
that runs underground for considerable length.  A disastrous explosion took 
place in a JP-4 aviation fuel underground tank at a US Air Force fuel depot near 
Bitburg, Germany, in 1954, killing 37 people [6].   
Various acceptance tests were being made on the newly constructed 
underground tank and its novel carbon dioxide fire extinguishing system, the 
first of its kind in Germany.  Present were French and German officials, 
technicians and contractors.  The roof of the underground tank was capped with 
iron reinforced concrete and covered with a layer of soil.  Most if not all of the 
victims were standing on the top of the tank during a controlled activation of 
the thermal sensing devices that would trigger CO₂ cylinders to discharge gas 
into the tank's headspace.   
The CO₂ cylinders were located in a half-buried concrete supply house located 
about 75 m from the tank and connected to the tank by a 4-inch steel pipeline 
which branched into two 3" pipelines that followed the circumference of the 
tank and terminated in four equally distanced discharge outlets .  The CO₂ 
pipeline was buried in the ground for its entire length and the discharge outlets 
were installed flush with the interior tank wall surface and welded to the main 
steel tank.  Although presumably effectively grounded, this piping arrangement 
conveyed electrostatically charged carbon dioxide.  
One minute after the CO₂ discharge commenced, a massive explosion 
disintegrated the tank.  The blast blew victims through the air with such force 
that their bodies were found between the tank and the supply house.  The 
official investigation  [6] did not identify carbon dioxide as the source of 
ignition; its ability to generate static electricity was only realized later [7]. 
3.5 Summary 
Back in 1977, Leonard and Clark [5] succinctly summarized the knowledge 
available at the time, concluding that CO₂ fire extinguishers are perfectly 
satisfactory when used for their intended purpose, i.e., extinguishing a fire, but 
they should never be used to inert atmospheres containing flammable fuel/air 
mixtures.   
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4 The 2010 silo explosion at Hallingdal 
4.1 The facility's fire history  
Hallingdal trepellets is a wood pellet manufacturer is located in Ål 
Municipality, Norway, about 200 km NW of Oslo.  Raw materials are 
pinewood and spruce, about 50/50.  The facility started production early in 
2007.   
On April 23, 2007, there was a serious fire, which started in a covered pit with 
approximately 200 m³ of dry (humidity 8%) wood chips in bulk.  The chips 
were still warm from the drying process.  An adjacent pit held wet wood chips, 
humidity about 50%.  A wooden wall separated the two pits.  The incident 
started as a minor smouldering fire.  Firefighters attempted to localize and 
contain the fire using various means such as infrared imagery, CO₂ 
extinguishers, fire hoses and steam lances, but the efforts were largely 
ineffective.  Suddenly, the fire intensified, and over a time span of less than 10 
minutes, developed into a blaze that spread rapidly to the production building.  
The fire rendered the facility a complete loss.  
The facility was rebuilt.  To avoid repeat fire contagion the dried wood chips 
were kept in a silo and the quantity stored was reduced.  In addition, a new 
concrete wall separated the wood chips area from the production building.   The 
following year, on July 5, 2008, there was a new fire in the wood chips area.   
This time the damage was limited thanks to the fire safety improvements.   
On July 5, 2010, the facility saw a third fire, this time in a 7,742 m³ silo for 
final product that had been completed the year before.  Shortly after midnight, 
firefighters were called to a smouldering fire in the silo.  Eventually, the silo 
exploded while firefighters attempted to quench the fire with inert carbon 
dioxide.   
4.2 The silo 
The silo diameter was 24 m and the circular shell wall was 15 m tall.  The apex 
of the cone roof was at 21 m.  A band conveyor system terminating below the 
apex dumped freshly produced pellets into a pile below.  To draw pellets, 
sliding doors in the floor could open and dump pellets onto a conveyor band.  
These doors were closed at the time of the fire.  Temperature sensors hung on 
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wires that run from the roof to the floor monitor the temperature inside the 
pellet pile.   
To enhance natural ventilation of the headspace, there was a 3 cm air gap 
between the silo shell and roof.  The total area of the airgap was about 2 m².  
The roof was made of thin metal sheets joined to the supporting frame with 
metal bolts and plastic nuts.  The total weight of the roof construction was 
about 27 t.  Because plastic nuts were used, the roof construction was believed 
to be weak and able to serve as overpressure relief in case of an internal 
explosion [8].  
4.3 Smouldering fire 
Shortly after midnight on July 5, 2010, at 0043 hours, the fire and rescue 
services were called to the facility.  Sensors in the pellet pile showed rising 
temperatures.  The silo was slightly less than 50 percent full, containing an 
estimated 3,500 m³ of wood pellets.  The on-scene-commander arrived at 0130 
hours.  He soon decided to request a shipment of nitrogen from Yara, a large 
producer of industrial gasses located in Porsgrunn some 320 km away.  At 0141 
hours, the pile temperature had increased to 60°C and an alarm came in from 
the silo's fixed CO detector.  At 0242 hours, infrared imagery was able to detect 
an increased temperature of the silo's outer shell, the pile temperature stayed at 
about 60 °C.  Smoke was now visible above the roof area.  Fire fighters 
received notice that a Yara nitrogen tanker truck was expected to arrive at noon.  
CO₂ bottles from nearby power stations were mobilized and arrived at 0635 
hours.  Only 22 bottles were available, about 220 m³ of CO₂ gas, just 5 percent 
of the headspace volume.  A revised estimate pushed the arrival of the nitrogen 
tanker truck to mid-afternoon, at the earliest.   
Although the effect of CO₂ injection was expected to be limited because of the 
modest quantities available, a CO₂ attack was decided, in the hope that it at 
least might attenuate the fire until nitrogen supplies arrived.  CO₂ would be 
injected manually from a fixed platform located next to a roof inspection hatch.  
A crane hoisted a basket with the bottles onto the platform and two firefighters 
with breathing apparatus climbed the silo's exterior ladder to manually 
discharge the CO₂ through the inspection hatch.   
4.4 Explosion 
At 0845 hours, when discharging the fifth CO₂ cylinder, the silo exploded.  The 
force of the explosion lifted the 27 t roof upwards and flames of burning gasses 
shot out of the hatch opening and horizontally from the circumferential edge of 
the roof.  Although the roof is believed to have lifted about 0.5 - 1 m, it re-
seated without collapsing.  There was no structural damage to the platform and 
the firefighters were able to descend the exterior ladder to ground level.  
The firefighters suffered burn injuries to the ear, back and hand.  Luckily, their 
full personal protective equipment offered excellent protection.  There was 
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evident heat blister damage to a helmet and to a facial mask.  The hood and 
jacket saw minor burn-through damage.  One firefighter suffered burns to his 
hand because he had taken off one of his bulky gloves in order to operate the 
valve on the CO₂ cylinder.  
After the explosion, the silo was considered a complete loss and an excavator 
was called in to tear a hole in the silo wall in order to empty the silo and 
extinguish the burning material outside.  When the silo was torn open, a large 
surface fire was visible inside the silo.   
4.5 Investigation 
Based on readings from the temperature sensors hung on wires inside the silo, 
the smouldering fire was believed to have started near the centre of the pellet 
pile.  Pellets had not been drawn from the silo for two weeks and it was 
speculated that self-heating of pellets deep inside the undisturbed pile could 
have started an oxygen deficient smouldering fire.  Pyrolysis gasses would then 
accumulate in the silo's headspace.   
The investigation identified the likely source of ignition to be a combustion 
zone break-through to the surface layer of the pellet pile.  The wind was 
blowing steady at 8-10 m/s and the investigation report argued that sufficient 
turbulent entry of air through the 3 cm airgap between the shell and roof could 
have formed an ignitable pyrolysis gas mixture under the roof.  In addition, that 
additional air entered the headspace through the open hatch when CO₂ was 
injected due to backdraft and wind.   
The investigation did not identify electrostatic effects due to injection of carbon 
dioxide as a possible source of ignition.  The national independent highly 
qualified senior fire investigator later stated that this mechanism was unknown 
to him. 
4.6 Source of ignition 
Ignition may have been caused by a sudden combustion zone break-through to 
the surface layer or by static electricity.  There is no empirical basis for this 
article to enter a discussion on the likelihood of either mechanism.  From an 
industrial accident prevention perspective, what matters most is the lack of 
awareness of the hazard of electrostatic effects amongst emergency responders 
and accident investigators. 
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Clarification of terms: Inerting and purging 
Terminology is important and it is useful to clarify precisely what is meant by 
inerting and purging.   
Where an ignitable mixture is contained, such as in a processing vessel, the 
atmosphere can be made oxygen deficient by introducing enough inert gas to 
make the mixture non-ignitable.  This technique is known as inerting in NFPA 
69 [9] and NFPA 77 [10].  The key characteristic is that the mixture of 
flammable gas and air is in the ignitable range before an inert gas is introduced. 
A different situation exists during start-up of process equipment.  Before a 
flammable gas is introduced into a system containing air, it is often 
recommended that the air in the system be diluted by a nonreactive (inert) gas 
such as nitrogen, carbon dioxide, or argon to low concentrations so that when 
flammable gas is introduced, an ignitable mixture cannot form within the 
system.  In the terminology commonly used in the petrochemical industry, this 
practice is known as "purging into service" [11].  
A similar situation arises during shut-down.  If a system that contains a 
flammable gas is to be taken out of service, the gas can be diluted by an inert 
gas to low concentration, so that when air is introduced, an ignitable mixture is 
not created within the system.  This practice is known as "purging out of 
service" [11]. 
While the two purging practices are similar in principle, it is useful to have two 
distinct concepts because purging out of service requires much larger quantities 
of inert gas than purging into service.  Carbon dioxide may be a suitable inert 
gas because both purging practices ensure that an ignitable mixture never forms 
in the system.  Hence, in theory, the introduction of a possible source of 
ignition due to static discharges is of no concern. 
Unfortunately, because an inert gas is used, both purging practices may loosely 
be referred to simply as "inerting".  But purging should not be confused with 
inerting where an ignitable mixture of flammable gas and air is made safe by 
adding an inert gas.  Carbon dioxide is unsuitable for this purpose.   
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5.2 German standards  
Much of the early knowledge and insights regarding the ability of CO₂ to create 
electrostatic discharges is based on work carried out in Germany, in particular 
insights gained after the disastrous Bitburg explosion in that country.  It is 
therefore noteworthy, that the hazard has no prominent place in German rules 
and guidelines.   
In Germany, the dangerous substances regulations are known as the Technische 
Regeln für Gefahrstoffe, TRGS (Technical rules for dangerous substances).  
The explosive atmospheres regulations are known as "Technische Regeln für 
Betriebssicherheit", TRBS (Technical Rules for Operating Safety).  Some of 
them overlap.  The relevant regulations are TRBS 2152, which comes in four 
parts [12–15].  Both the general section (part 1) [12] and the detailed technical 
requirements for preventing or mitigating a hazardous explosive atmosphere 
(part 2) [13] are silent on the electrostatic discharge hazard.   
It is true, that part two deals only with purging in and out of service, in German 
terminology referred to as "partial inerting" and "total inerting" respectively, for 
which static discharges in principle are of no concern.  Still, a warning about 
electrostatic discharges might be particularly relevant, for instance, in section 
2.3.4, which deals with vessels in vacuum service, for which the safety system 
can be so designed that detection of an operational upset with air ingress will 
trigger an automated inerting response.  The absence of a warning is 
noteworthy because the standard lists other types of situations where carbon 
dioxide (and nitrogen) are unsuitable inerting agents, e.g., that fine dusts of 
certain light metals may undergo chemical reaction with these gasses.   
Part three [14] of TRBS 2152 does make passing reference on page 29 to 
another standard, TRBS 2153 [16], which deals with static electricity, but there 
is no specific mention that the inert gas carbon dioxide itself could be a source 
of static electricity.  The TRBS 2153 standard on electrostatics clearly 
identifies the static hazard on pages 64-65 out of 128.  It states that processes 
that may produce considerable static discharge include: "pneumatic transport of 
solids, a release of pressurized gas with solids, the discharge of liquid carbon 
dioxide, industrial vacuum cleaners and spray painting operations" [16] 
(emphasis added).  
The TRBS 2153 standard also covers the situation when an ignitable mixture of 
flammable gas and air is to be made safe by adding an inert gas quite 
extensively, which is referred to simply as "inerting", similar to the terminology 
of NFPA 69 and NFPA 77.  The standard cautions that the discharge of a fire 
extinguishment agent, which could produce static discharges, should never be 
carried out for test purposes, when a potentially explosive atmosphere exists.  
The standard specifically states that CO₂ and wet steam (steam with droplets of 
water) are unsuitable inerting agents for this purpose [16].  This is the closest 
reference to the lessons learned from the Bitburg disaster.  
In conclusion, is it probably fair to assume that safety-conscious readers with a 
prior concern or expectation that CO₂ is able to create hazardous electrostatic 
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discharges will consult the TRBS 2153 standard on static electricity [16] and 
see their prior expectation confirmed.  Safety-conscious but unsuspecting 
readers, however, are likely to consult the TBRS 2152 standard on flammable 
atmospheres only.  A meticulous examination of the four documents that 
comprise this standard will provide no clue as to the electrostatic hazard. 
It is true that information on the electrostatic hazard does exist.  A German fire 
safety professional kindly informed that the European Industrial Gases 
Association (EIGA) covered the issue in a safety newsletter [17], which is also 
available in English [18].  This article argues however, that there is 
considerable evidence to suggest that the hazard is not widely appreciated.  For 
instance an article in a German firefighter magazine [19] discusses two cases of 
fighting smouldering silo fires using CO₂, evidently oblivious of the 
electrostatic hazard. 
5.3 NFPA standards  
NFPA standards mirror German ones, confirming the electrostatic hazard of 
carbon dioxide to those readers who consult a standard on static electricity 
because they already suspect the gas to have these properties, but are otherwise 
mostly silent on the issue.  NFPA 77 on static electricity clearly states that 
carbon dioxide from high-pressure cylinders or fire extinguishers should never 
be used to inert a container or vessel [10] (emphasis added).  
NFPA 69 [9] on explosion prevention systems does neither mention 
electrostatic effects nor refer to NFPA 77 although the standard lists the 
following purge gas sources as acceptable: commercially available inert gas, 
such as nitrogen, carbon dioxide, argon, or helium, supplied from high-pressure 
tanks or cylinders.  The standard's use of the terms purging and inerting is not 
entirely unambiguous. 
NFPA 12 [20] on carbon dioxide extinguishing systems provides potentially 
ambiguous advice on the electrostatic hazard.  Annex A states that the 
discharge of liquid carbon dioxide is known to produce electrostatic charges 
that, under certain conditions, could create a spark and duly refers to NFPA 77.  
The standard also specifies, that "carbon dioxide fire-extinguishing systems 
protecting areas where explosive atmospheres could exist shall utilize metal 
nozzles, and the entire system shall be grounded" [20, Sec. 4.2.1] (emphasis 
added).  The first issue of concern is if the reader realizes that an explosive 
atmospheres can exist not only when flammable liquids give off vapours but 
also when pyrolysis gasses have accumulated.  The second issue of concern is 
if effective grounding is sufficient to prevent hazardous electrostatic discharges 
– the Bitburg accident would appear to contraindicate this.  The third and 
perhaps most important issue of concern is the standard's advice on the 
application of CO₂ to "deep-seated fires involving solids subject to smoldering" 
[20, Sec 5.2.3].  This is precisely the situation where pyrolysis gasses may have 
accumulated in the headspace to an extent where they are in the ignitable range 
– but the reader may not have realized this, and the standard does not identify 
the potential presence of flammable gasses.  The nub of the issue may well be 
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lack of clarity in the meaning of the terms "fire" and "extinguishment", which 
are not defined in the standard's terminology section.  The application of CO₂ is 
excellent for extinguishing a fire with flames, but unsuitable for quenching a 
deep seated smouldering fire without flame.  
Annex A of the NFPA 850 [21] covers spontaneous heating, hotspot formation 
and fire in coal silos  Firefighting in coal silos is a long and difficult activity , 
the standard says, but carbon dioxide and nitrogen have been used successfully 
as gaseous inerting systems.  The standard specifically states that carbon 
dioxide vapour has proven to be effective in quickly establishing an inert 
atmosphere in the space above the coal, which prevents the creation of an 
explosive atmosphere there.  Carbon dioxide has the advantage over nitrogen of 
being denser than air, the standard says.  Because nitrogen has a density similar 
to air it must be applied at numerous injection points around the silo to ensure 
that it displaces available oxygen.  Compared to carbon dioxide, the standard 
says, nitrogen requires more injection equipment and a larger quantity of agent.   
It is true that injection of carbon dioxide can prevent the creation of an 
explosive atmosphere in the silo headspace.  This article argues however, that 
the procedure is unsafe because plant personnel or firefighters usually have 
limited means to determine if pyrolysis gasses present in the headspace are 
already in the ignitable range when the injection begins.  The standard is silent 
on the electrostatic hazards of carbon dioxide. 
5.4 Special report on US agricultural silos 
Fires and explosions in agricultural silos have been responsible for the deaths 
and injuries of firefighters and civilians and have led to large loss of property.  
In response to a number of agricultural silo emergencies, the United States Fire 
Administration issued a Special Report in 1998 [22] in order to communicate 
significant lessons learned.   
Spontaneous ignition and smouldering fires in agricultural silos present 
challenges to firefighters.  The report states that extinguishment may be 
accomplished by injecting nitrogen or carbon dioxide into the silo using special 
fittings and piping.  The report is silent on the electrostatic hazards of carbon 
dioxide. 
5.5 Swedish contributions 
Sweden is the only country in Scandinavia with a significant domestic pellet 
production.  The domestic pellet market is mature and pellet consumers are 
diverse, from single-family households, industry, district-heating systems and 
large Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants.  For many years, Sweden was 
the largest consumer of wood pellets in the EU and was only in 2012 surpassed 
by Italy and Denmark [23].  
Ambitious and foresighted research programmes have been undertaken by the 
Swedish National Testing and Research Institute (in Swedish: Sveriges 
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Prövnings- och Forskningsinstitut, abbreviated to SP) to address, inter alia, the 
challenges with wood pellet silo fires.  In 2006, the SP reported the results of an 
experimental study on fire extinguishment in wood pellet silos [24].  The study 
concluded that extinguishment should be carried out with injection of nitrogen 
or carbon dioxide, primarily into the bottom of the silo, although injection into 
the headspace at an early stage could be considered in order to eliminate 
explosion risks, i.e. inerting.  According to the report, the use of carbon dioxide 
merely presents practical problems because injection lances freeze up – the 
report is silent on the risk of electrostatic discharges.  
The inert gas technique was applied e.g. in 2007, when a pellet silo in 
Kristinehamn, Sweden, experienced a smouldering fire due to self-ignition 
[25].  Tanker trucks with nitrogen and carbon dioxide were called to the site.  
Preparations for injection of nitrogen into the bottom of the silo were 
repeatedly delayed due to multiple complications when drilling openings in the 
concreate silo and with the improvised making of custom injection lances.  Not 
to waste time, carbon dioxide was therefore introduced into the silo headspace 
through a fire hose.  The hose froze up and plugged repeatedly.  A total of 35 t 
of carbon dioxide were injected without incident.  Evidently, the emergency 
responders and technical advisors from SP were oblivious to the risk of 
electrostatic discharges.   
In 2011, the novel inert gas approach was communicated widely in Biomass 
Magazine [26] and Canadian Biomass [27], without mention of the electrostatic 
hazard.  The Swedish experiences have also found way into popular pellet 
handbooks, e.g. [1] published in 2012, which merely states that attempts to use 
carbon dioxide without a vaporisation unit have caused many unsuccessful 
extinguishing operations as the supply hoses/lances /nozzles and the bulk 
material close to the injection point tend to freeze quickly, blocking further gas 
injection.  An almost verbatim description is provided in an otherwise 
comprehensive publication on health and safety aspects of solid biomass 
published in 2013 by the International Energy Agency [28].  The publications 
are also silent on the risk of electrostatic discharges. 
In 2013, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency issued a report on silo fires, 
written in English and clearly intended for an international audience [2].  This 
report, at last, does advice against the use of CO₂ due to risks of static 
electricity during gas injection.  But the report is a sole voice of caution in an 
abundance of standards, guidelines and literature that appear to be oblivious of 
the hazard.   
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6 Conclusion  
Policy makers and risk analysis professionals may wish that the state of 
knowledge is always increasing, that accident prevention knowledge is 
continuously improving, as if obeying a fundamental law of physics.  This case 
shows that the opposite can occur.  That important information on hazards, 
learned the hard way through investigation of past disastrous explosions, can 
pass out of sight.  This appears to have happened in the fast growing wood 
pellet sector where difficulties with smouldering fires has led to new techniques 
for firefighting which employ inert gasses, of which carbon dioxide is one.  
With the increase in the quantities of solid biomass handled, this knowledge 
loss becomes significant.  The smouldering fires are difficult to deal with, water 
is not a suitable extinguishment agent, and firefighters, who are men of action, 
can become frustrated if having to wait idly for supplies of nitrogen to arrive.  
If carbon dioxide extinguishers are available it may be tempting to "do 
something" to retard fire development. 
It is true that standards on static electricity, e.g. NFPA 77, do mention the 
electrostatic hazard of carbon dioxide.  Safety conscious readers however, are 
likely to consult such standards only if they already suspect carbon dioxide to 
have electrostatic properties.  Safety conscious but unsuspecting readers will 
likely consult standards on flammable atmospheres only, which are silent on 
the electrostatic hazard.  Popular wood pellet handbooks are also silent on the 
hazard.  
NFPA 12 on carbon dioxide extinguishment systems should be more specific 
on the presence of pyrolysis gasses when extinguishing smouldering fires.  The 
application of CO₂ is excellent for extinguishing a fire with flames, but can be 
unsuitable for quenching a deep seated smouldering fire without flame. 
The standards, guidelines and handbooks examined provide little information 
on the electrostatic hazards of carbon dioxide, supporting a general conclusion 
that that the hazard appears to be widely under-appreciated, across countries.  
Important fields of application, such the practice of installing CO₂ 
extinguishment systems in the cargo hold of marine vessels, some carrying 
wood pellets susceptible to smouldering fires, could not be covered in this 
work. More research into the subject is needed. 
The past decade has seen a major increase in the consumption of wood pellets.  
The growth has been mirrored in an increase of pellet related accidents 
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involving fires, dust explosions and toxic gasses, some of which have been 
poorly investigated, causes not identified and lessons not learned [29,30].  A 
small but growing body of literature argues that bioenergy and other low-
carbon energy systems present major accident hazards [31–34]. There are even 
indications that the number of accidents in the bioenergy sector is growing 
faster than the energy production [33]. 
Utmost care should be taken to avoid so-called media- shifting [35], i.e. that the 
resolution of a problem within one domain, the environmental, creates a new 
problem in another, the workplace safety domain. 
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